By Rhys Kissell
Publication Date: 2026-05-05 20:00:00
In 2025, opposing forces led by Ukraine defeated NATO formations in two major exercises. During the Hedgehog exercise in Estonia, around ten drone operators used cheap first-person view drones to disable two NATO battalions within half a day. In Dynamic Messenger off Portugal, a Ukrainian-led red team defeated NATO naval forces in all five scenarios and sank a frigate undetected – with low-cost systems that cost a fraction of the platforms they destroyed.
NATO forces were unable to detect or combat them. The electromagnetic warfare (EW) capabilities that could have made this happen – software-defined, AI-powered systems capable of identifying and disrupting drone control links over a wide area – were either non-existent or inadequate.
These are referred to as cognitive EW systems. The technology exists, and in fact my company is working on it. The failure to deploy cognitive EW is an adaptation problem and Australia risks entrenching the problem in policy.
Cognitive EW systems do not work with pre-installed…
